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University of Maastricht†
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Abstract
This paper argues that although current public pension schemes may
shift the major financial burden to future generations, private and public
transfers of wealth across generations oﬀset this development. As a result
the financing of existing social security and pension arrangements seems
to be less problematic than commonly assumed.
Policy models that assume there is no linkage between generations
except through the state bear little resemblance to empirical reality. An
accounting system is therefore needed which highlights the allocation of
retirement costs among working and retired population as well as future
generations, and includes the public as well as private ledger.
Many of the aformentioned features are included in the well-established
practice of ‘Generational Accounting’. This paper, however, will integrate
private as well as public intergenerational transfers of wealth so as to
account not only for the burden, which current generations leave, but also
the wealth, which is passed on to future generations.
1 Introduction
Generational Accounting’ was developed in order to unfold the ‘long-term’ fiscal
stance of governments.[12] In contrast to the traditional budgetary approach,
it is based on the life-cycle hypothesis, which means it evaluates the financial
burden, which current and future generations face, based on lifetime taxes paid
and lifetime transfers received.[1] ‘Generational Accounting’ had a decisive im-
pact on the pension debate, since its empirical application to many countries
led to the conclusion that future generations are seriously overtaxed, if current
provisions are not revised. Taking account of the unprecedented demographic
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transition at the beginning of the 21st century in most of the advanced countries,
‘Generational Accounting’ questions the fiscal sustainability of the current social
security- and pension arrangements stating that the burden on future genera-
tions is actually so overwhelming that current arrangements are unsustainable
and that there is no other choice than to drastically alter current institutional
arrangements.1
This paper challenges the latter view by arguing that if private transfers
across generations are taken into account within a ‘Generational Accounting’
framework, the picture is far less gloomy since future generations are not only
left with the burden of the current expenditures to be financed, but also with
a considerable stock of wealth. This may sound comfortable; it leaves, how-
ever, both serious policy- and theoretical questions to be addressed. The policy
questions relate to distributional issues, taxability and the allocation of the tax
burden; the theoretical questions, on the other hand, refer to the relationship
between altruistic behaviour, the life-cycle model of consumption and the Ri-
cardian equivalence theorem.
Ever since Adam Smith published ‘The Wealth of Nations’ the appropriate
size of governments has been at the heart of political discussions. Traditionally
much of this debate has centred on the public debt due to its alleged harmful
correlation with interest rates, national savings, economic growth and current
account deficits.[8] In the last decades this neoclassical view has been challenged,
however, by the Ricardian equivalence theorem, which is based on the assump-
tion that altruistic economic agents fully internalise the budget constraint of
their descendants.[2] In contrast to the neoclassical view, the Ricardian equiv-
alence therefore states that private households conceive debt financed public
expenditures as higher taxes in the future, which induces them to increase their
savings to enable future generations to pay for them. Consequently national
saving is not reduced, there is no eﬀect on the interest rate and therefore also
no eﬀect on the capital stock and economic growth in the future.
However, it is not only the alleged harmful eﬀect of the public debt, but also
its definition, which is a source of controversy. Many believe that the impact
of fiscal policies on today’s economy and the burden, which is being placed
on future generations, is not adequately measured by simple government debt
figures. In response ‘Generational Accounting’ was developed.
In line with earlier publications this paper argues that the forward-looking
life-cycle perspective implicit in ‘Generational Accounting’ represents a change
of paradigm in the definition of the public debt and consequently oﬀers a more
accurate picture of the sustainability of today’s fiscal policies (section 2).
It is however also argued that ‘Generational Accounting’ does not resolve the
first debate hinted at above about the impact, which the public debt has, on the
economy and future generations. More specifically, it will be shown with data
1Strictly speaking ‘Generational Accounting’ looks at the entire public ledger. As however
social security and pension systems constitute the largest share in the government budget in
most industrialised countries, their future financial situation decisively influences the conclu-
sions drawn from it.
2
for the UK, that the sole concentration on the public ledger in the context of
the traditional methodology of ‘Generational Accounting’ results in misleading
conclusions regarding the intergenerational impact of fiscal policies as soon as
decision horizons diﬀer from the strict life-cycle model (section 3).
Despite the policy relevance of this conclusion, it does not solve the question
about the interpretation of shifts in transfers and taxes between generations
or in other words, about the validity of the Ricardian equivalence theorem.
Therefore, the interpretative limitations of our approach and the theoretical
issues raised will be further discussed in the concluding paragraph (section 4).
2 The original methodology
Although the concept of the government debt is the most widely used indicator
to measure the intergenerational impact of fiscal policies in neoclassical theory,
its conceptual framework is a long-debated topic in economics. It has been
argued that the traditional budgetary approach is an inappropriate indicator
to measure the intergenerational distribution of the public burden, as it is only
based on the annual equation of public revenues and expenditures. It therefore
fails to include the long-term revenue and expenditure implications of present
fiscal policies, which are relevant when economic agents make economic decisions
with a life-cycle perspective.[1]
As said in the introduction, ‘Generational Accounting’, which has been de-
veloped as a reaction to these criticisms, contains this life-cycle approach by
starting from the intertemporal government budget constraint.
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The intertemporal budget constraint of the government states that all cur-
rent and future purchases by the government (
P∞
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be financed either through the remaining net tax payments of currently liv-
ing generations (
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net wealth of the government (W gt ) or the tax payments of future generations
(
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t−s¤). The intergenera-
tional imbalance is, consequently, calculated assuming that future generations
have to finance all government bills that have been left uncovered by generations
already alive in the base year t. Hence, mathematically the aggregate financial
burden that future generations have to bear is defined as the residual of the
other three components of the intertemporal budget constraint.
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In order to unfold the intergenerational impact of current fiscal policies (i.e.
whether individual members of future generations face a higher lifetime net tax
burden compared to members of currently living generations) it is, however,
necessary to go beyond this macroeconomic perspective. For this reason the
aggregate amounts, which have to be taken over by currently living and future
generations, are broken down to the microeconomic level, resulting in the av-
erage remaining net tax payments members of the diﬀerent generations k still
have to pay over their remaining lifetime (i.e. the generational accounts).
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“A generational account is the present value of the per capita net
taxes that a generation will pay for the rest of its life under the
assumed fiscal policy.”2
Note that the definition of the generational accounts implies that only new-
borns in year t and individual members of future generations directly compare,
2Gokhale, Page and Sturrock (1998[13]), pp.4-5
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as both still have their whole lifetime ahead of them. Hence, the intergen-
erational imbalance of current fiscal policies in the context of ‘Generational
Accounting’ is revealed in the diﬀerent magnitudes of the generational accounts
of newborns in year t and future generations. A larger generational account
for future generations therefore signifies that current fiscal policies cannot be
maintained into the future without putting an ‘extra’ burden onto them.
Cardarelli, Kotlikoﬀ and Sefton (1999[7]) have produced the first set of gen-
erational accounts for the United Kingdom based on the fiscal year 1997. Us-
ing the above-described methodology of ‘Generational Accounting’ they have
shown that fiscal policies in the UK are rather sound, as future generations are
expected to face only slightly higher generational accounts compared to new-
borns in 1997. For reasons of comparability with these earlier results this study
adopts the same methodological approach in constructing a new set of genera-
tional accounts for the base-year 2001.3 As in the aforementioned earlier study
the baseline scenario is calculated assuming a 1.75% growth and a 5% discount
rate. The corresponding results for male generations in the UK are:
1997 2001
Newborns 49,290 54,520
Future Generations 60,823 53,350
Table 1: Generational accounts with base year 19974 and base year 2001
in 2001 pound Sterling.
From table 1 it can be seen that regulatory changes in the tax and bene-
fit system as well as changed population projections have slightly altered the
picture. Although the diﬀerence is very small, future generations are expected
to pay less lifetime net taxes compared to newborns in 2001. In the context of
‘Generational Accounting’ this constitutes a slight improvement in the intergen-
erational balance of current fiscal policies. Fiscal policies in the United Kingdom
could therefore be maintained into the future without putting an ‘extra’ burden
on future generations.
Although the results (table 1) for the United Kingdom are encouraging, a
global comparison of generational accounts suggests that nearly all industrialised
countries with mature welfare states do shift a substantial public debt towards
future generations through the institutions of the state.[14] Therefore it has
been argued on the basis of the results obtained by ‘Generational Accounting’:
“Unless currently living members of these countries pay more in net
taxes or unless these countries dramatically cut their purchases of
goods and services, future Americans, Japanese, and Germans will
face dramatically higher rates of lifetime net taxation.”5
3For a more detailed methodological treatment see Cardarelli, Kotlikoﬀ and Sefton
(1999[7])
4Data taken from Cardarelli, Kotlikoﬀ and Sefton (1999[7])
5Kotlikoﬀ , Leibfritz and Auerbach (1999[14]), p.100
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This quote suggests that if current fiscal policies are maintained, future
generations will have to spend a big share of their generated economic value on
benefits which currently living generations enjoy. Note however that this conclu-
sion drawn from the results based on the original methodology of ‘Generational
Accounting’ is only true when no private intergenerational transfers are made.
If, to the contrary of the above, economic agents either care about the welfare of
their siblings (e.g. altruistic behaviour) or face insecurity with regard to their life
expectancy, private intergenerational transfers occur, which compensate future
generations for the financial burden left to them through the institutions of the
state. Generational accounts, which only take into account public transfers, are
therefore misleading, as either intentional or unintentional private intergenera-
tional transfers might compensate future generations for the public debt, which
is shifted to them. This highlights the fact that “the usefulness of generational
accounts as a summary of the budget’s impact on the intergenerational distrib-
ution of private consumption and on aggregate consumption lives or dies with
the validity of the strict life-cycle model of household consumption”6, which
says that economic agents only save for consumption at later stages of their life
and consequently do not leave private wealth to future generations.
For this reason it can be argued that generational accounts are uninformative
as regards the budget’s intergenerational impact as soon as decision horizons
intentionally or unintentionally diﬀer from those postulated by the life-cycle
model of consumption.
Concluding, as ‘Generational Accounting’ is based on the strict life-cycle
model and, thus, contains the long-term revenue and expenditure prospects of
governments, it gives a more accurate account of the government’s indebtedness.
However as it is only based on the inter-temporal budget constraint of the gov-
ernment it disregards the changes in private saving and consumption behaviour,
which are decisive in order to understand the intergenerational impact of the
public ledger. It therefore is to be seen as a serious improvement in estimating
the ‘real’ fiscal burden of government policies, but leaves unresolved the debate
about the question in how far this indebtedness has harmful consequences for
the economy in the long run. Hence, the procedure has to take into account pri-
vate intergenerational flows in trying to capture the eﬀect current fiscal policies
have on aggregate demand, on private savings and the intergenerational net tax
burden.
In the next section a methodological way is proposed which enables to ac-
count for private intergenerational flows in the context of ‘Generational Account-
ing’. It can be called the ‘Net-Wealth of Society’ approach. This approach starts
from the perspective that the private wealth accumulated so far will be passed
on to future generations. Rather than accounting solely for the net wealth of
the government, as done in the original methodology of ‘Generational Account-
ing’, the approach will define and calculate the net wealth of society, which will
consequently be used to determine the financial burden that current and future
generations will have to face.
6Buiter (1996[6]), p. 605
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3 The ‘Net-Wealth of Society’ - The extended
model
The negative implications of the public ledger very much depend on the question
whether future generations are privately compensated for the public debt left
to them. Therefore, policy models that assume there is no linkage between
generations except through the state bear little resemblance to reality. An
accounting system, which highlights the allocation of the public burden among
working and retired population as well as future generations, needs to include
both, the public and private ledger. Hence it is necessary to account for the
financial flows that privately link generations in the context of generational
accounting.[6]
In contrast to the original methodology of generational accounting, the ex-
tended model proposed here is based on the budget constraint of the society
as a whole, not only on the budget constraint of the government. It aims at
including net private wealth in addition to the net government wealth, in order
to get a better understanding of the true fiscal stance of society as a whole.
Net private wealth, in this respect, is the accumulated net asset by the private
households over the past plus the amount of wealth that currently living gener-
ations are still expected to accumulate over their remaining lifetime assuming
a constant propensity to consume. Note that the assumption of a constant
propensity to consume in the extended model is the private sector equivalent to
the assumption about unchanged fiscal policies in the original methodology of
‘Generational Accounting’.
Adding net private wealth, as defined above, to the net public wealth in
the budget constraint of the government gives the ‘Net Wealth of Society’. In
analogy with equation 2 the government budget constraint, which integrates the
‘Net-Wealth of Society’, can be expressed as:
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Note:
W pt = Net private wealth accumulated by past and current generations
Sps,k= Private savings of generation k in all current and future years s
W gt = Net government wealth
NWSt= Net wealth of society in base year t
The ‘Net-Wealth of Society’ (NWSt) is defined as the sum of the net gov-
ernment wealth (W gt ) plus the net private wealth, which past and current gen-
erations have accumulated so far, (W pt ) plus the savings that generations al-
ready alive in year t are still expected to set aside over their remaining lifetime
(
Pk+D
s=t S
p
s,k(1+ rs)
t−s). The financial net lifetime burden of future generations
is therefore calculated taking into consideration the total stock of net wealth,
which past and living generations are expected to pass on to future generations.
The remaining savings of all generations already alive in 2001 can be estimated
as the diﬀerence between the incomes that they are still expected to earn over
their remaining lifetime and the remaining lifetime consumption:
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Note:
Y ps,k= Average income of generation k in all current and future years s
Cps,k= Private savings of generation k in all current and future years s
As a part of the net wealth of society, net private wealth should take account
of the real and financial wealth of private households. Real wealth is defined as
the sum of durable consumer goods as well as real estate net of loans. Financial
wealth on the other hand comprises life insurance, money holdings, securities
and shares, deposits and accumulated assets in private pension schemes.
The amount of net personal wealth in the United Kingdom in 2000 has been
estimated at 4535 billion pounds.
Assets Liabilities Net Wealth
Personal Wealth 5,145 610 4,535
Table 2: Personal wealth estimates for 2000 (Amounts: £ thousand million)7
7The data are derived from those published in the July 2002 edition of Financial
Statistics and the 2002 Blue Book of United Kingdom National Accounts, adjusted
for those assets held by non-profit-making bodies such as charities and to mid 2000
values. (Source: Inland Revenue)
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Adjusting the personal wealth (W pt ) for growth in order to receive an es-
timate for 2001 gives 4,614 £ thousand million. Extrapolating income and
consumption patterns into the future and discounting them back to the base
year t gives an estimated 1,143 £ thousand million in remaining lifetime savings
of generations already alive in year t.
Using these values in the context of the extended methodology gives gener-
ational accounts for male newborns in 2001 and future generations of:
2001
Newborns 54,520
Future Generations -157,179
Table 3: Extended generational accounts including the ’Net-Wealth of Society’8
From table 3 it can be seen that if current fiscal rules are maintained into the
future and the propensity to consume of generations already alive in the base
year 2001 does not change, future generations will face a negative generational
account (-157 thousand pounds), which literally means they receive transfers
instead of paying taxes (i.e. negative taxes).
Whenever generational accounts of future generations are smaller in mag-
nitude as compared to generations already alive in the base year t the original
model suggest that some wealth of currently living generations is transferred to
future generations through the institutions of the state. Hence future genera-
tions can enjoy the same level of public benefits at a lower ’tax’ price. In the
extended model the conclusion that future generations receive transfers either
through the institutions of the state or through private intergenerational links
that exist in reality holds. Correspondingly, combining the results from the
first and the second part of the analysis shows that future generations in the
United Kingdom are expected to receive a considerable private financial transfer
from past and currently living generations. As the public generational account
(table 1) based on the original methodology of ‘Generational Accounting’ was
balanced and the integration of private financial flows between generations into
the methodology (table 3) has led to highly negative generational accounts for
future generations, it becomes clear that individual members of future male
generations in the United Kingdom receive a net private transfer of about 200
thousand pounds.
4 Conclusions and unresolved issues
This paper points out that ‘Generational Accounting’ is an interesting way to
estimate the burden of current policies upon future generations. In its approach,
however, it seriously overestimates the net-costs imposed on the future by ignor-
ing private intergenerational transfers. Taking private intergenerational trans-
fers into account using what we called the ‘Net-Wealth of Society’ approach,
8The annual growth rate is assumed to be 1.75% and the annual discount rate is
5%.
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allows us to conclude that for the UK future generations will receive rather
than pay; this means that future generations receive far more in transfers from
current economic prosperity than what is left to be paid for the expenditures
on the social well-being of the current generations. More popularly said: there
are enough funds to finance the current government expenditures including the
costs of caring for the growing number of elderly persons.9 What is true for the
UK is partially also true for other advanced capitalist economies although the
financial burden of especially the pension system highly diﬀer. Estimates for
Germany, for example, using slightly diﬀerent methods resulted in the same type
of conclusions although the net transfers to future generations are estimated to
be relatively smaller for that country.[16]
This, however, does not imply that the policy problem of financing govern-
ment expenditures including the dramatic demographic transition in Europe is
resolved. The ‘Net-Wealth of Society’ approach, as ‘Generational Accounting’,
is basically a technique that estimates economy-wide costs and transfers; it does
not provide any information on distributional issues. Whether the wealth with
future generations will be distributed in a way that it can be mobilized through
taxes, is an open question. With the ability guaranteed, the willingness to pay
becomes the crucial issue, potentially leaving the state with a definite risk of
being unable to serve its debt. This brings policy research in this area to the
point where ’taxability’ becomes the main issue when deciding whether current
government expenditures and welfare provisions are financially sustainable in
the long term.
The theoretical issues raised by this paper are puzzling. This paper empha-
sizes the magnitude of private intergenerational transfers and their relevance
for estimating the debt burden on future generations.10 The ‘Net-Wealth of
Society’ approach does not, however, provide any information on the welfare
eﬀects of these flows. The welfare eﬀects of these flows depend on the degree of
altruism in society, i.e. the degree to which the Ricardian equivalence theorem
holds. Ricardian equivalence is only realized if the future generations are pri-
vately compensated for the public debt left to them, which in turn is conditioned
by the underlying transfer (bequest-) motives.
If economic agents are fully altruistic or face insecurity with regard to their
life expectancy, as mentioned earlier, the private flows, which the analysis has
identified, are compensatory. Private transfers between generations, though,
can also take place without the existence of altruistic behaviour or insecurity
with regard to life expectancy. Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1986[3]) have
indicated that private intergenerational transfers could be used “to purchase a
commodity from the child”11. In this case private transfers merely constitute a
payment in exchange of a commodity provided by younger generations. They
do not compensate for higher taxes in the future. Hence the predominance
9This is an empirical confirmation of what Buiter (1996[6]) concluded from a theoretical
assessment of ‘Generational Accounting’.
10Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1998[15]) provided first estimates for the significance of private
intergenerational transfers for the USA.
11Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1986[3]), pp. 151-182.
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of a strategic bequest or transfer motive would bring the analysis back into
the boundaries of the life-cycle model of consumption and thus the original
methodology of ‘Generational Accounting’.
From this perspective, it can be argued that the original methodology of
‘Generational Accounting’, by ignoring private intergenerational transfers, rep-
resents the one extreme case of a strict life-cycle model. The ’Net-Wealth of
Society’, on the other hand, represents the other extreme by implicitly assum-
ing altruistic behaviour and/or insecurity about ones’ remaining lifetime and
excluding the idea that (some of the) private intergenerational transfers are
actually payments made for commodities. This paper therefore by no means
allows drawing conclusions about the welfare implication of current government
expenditures. Making some progress in answering this question requires the
consideration of a general equilibrium model. The reality will most probably
be situated between the two extremes, but the authors are pretty pessimistic
on the possibility of qualitatively assessing the predominance of either altruistic
(and/or risk aversion) or strict life cycle behaviour wherein every generation
‘pays its own bills’ (except of what is left over in government wealth or debt).
List of Equations
(1) Intertemporal government budget constraint
(2) The public financial burden of future generations - The residual approach
(3) Ind. generational accounts of generation k already alive in base year s
(4) Government budget constraint including the ‘Net-Wealth of Society’
(5) ’Net-Wealth of Society’
(6) Remaining savings of generations already alive in base year t
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